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LABOR LAW, ECONOMIC NARRATIVE AND LAW & ECONOMICS:
THE METHOD IS THE PROBLEM

*

Sergio Gamonal C.

"They made a science out ofpeople?" she said. "What a crazy science
that must be."
-

Kurt Vonnegutt

INTRODUCTION: NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC NARRATIVE AND
HEGEMONY

I.

If you were asked to take a plane and knew it was not designed by
engineers but rather by lawyers, would you take it? What if historians or
What if it were actually designed by
sociologists designed it?
economists? In all the previous cases, you would probably have serious
doubts before boarding a device that might not fly or that, if it succeeds in
flying, may end up crashing to the ground.
It is clear that since the beginning of the modem era, people put a lot
of trust in engineers and scientists in general. Natural sciences, known as
exact sciences or hard sciences, have spurred spectacular developments in
technology, to the point that flying is now even safer than driving.2
The scientific method has allowed us to dominate nature, and
although there is still much to learn regarding those matters, much of the
physical world has become susceptible to accurate prediction.3
However, the same phenomenon does not occur when it comes to

* Professor of Labor Law, Faculty of Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibdfiez, Santiago, Chile
(sergio.gamonal@uai.cl) (www.glosalaboral.cl). The author would like to thank Matias Rodriguez
for his comments and a special thanks to Ann McGinley, Jeff Stempel and C6sar Rosado MarzAn for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Any mistake is exclusively the author's
responsibility. The translation to English has been done by Daniela Rossi B. student of Faculty of
Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibifiez. A first and more extensive version of this work was published in
Spanish in Sergio Gamonal C., Derecho Laboral, Economia y Pseudociencia, 3(1) DERECHO Y
CRiTICA SOCIAL 1-44, https://derechoycriticasocial.com.

1. Kurt Vonnegut, Mr. Z, in WHILE MORTALS SLEEP. UNPUBLISHED SHORT
FICTION. (Dial Press Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2011) 188.
2. NS Aurelio Locsin, Is Air Travel Safer Than Car Travel?, USA Today (Feb. 11, 2018),
http://traveltips.usatoday.com/air-travel-safer-car-travel-1581.hbtml.

3.

See Galit Shmueli, To Explain or to Predict, 25 STAT. SCI. 289, 291-92 (2010).
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social sciences. Law, sociology, and economics contain an element of
permanent uncertainty-the human being. The theories behind these
disciplines are constantly debated and it is difficult to contrast them with
an objective reality. That is why you would be afraid to fly in a plane
designed by lawyers, considering that lawyers rarely agree. Or by
sociologists, who debate intensely about many theories on society. Or by
economists, who even though they support their theories with
mathematical calculations, graphs, and statistics, are almost never able to
predict rates of growth or when a great crisis may arrive.
Regardless, many economists are known for trying to demonstrate
that their discipline is as scientific as the natural sciences. The tone of
many economists is that of a mathematician who lectures on what should
or should not be done, especially in other areas such as politics and law.4
This could be merely anecdotal and many of us would agree that the lack
of humility and true critical spirit of many economists reflects a serious
defect of that discipline.
However, the situation is much more serious. With the development
of the economic analysis of law (hereafter L&E), since the 1960s many
economists have freely commented on how, when, and where to regulate.s
This is what Professor Stewart Schwab has called "the [e]conomic
[i]nvasion of [l]abor [1]aw." 6
And in the case of labor law, according to economists, regulation is
almost always unwise and ill-timed, except when it comes to limiting
union activity.7 Economic critiques of labor law have created a narrative
adverse to workers and unions that has unfortunately influenced many
policymakers.8
This paper argues that the economic narrative is overvalued,
considering that it pretends to be an exact science when it is, in fact, a
social science. This narrative has spread to law and almost every aspect
of human life, as Michael J. Sandel points out: "Over the past three
decades, markets-and market values-have come to govern our lives as
never before. We did not arrive at this condition through any deliberate
choice. It is almost as if it came upon us." 9
4.

See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 2,

2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?em=&pagewanted=all.
5.

S.J. Schwab, The Economics Invasion of Labor Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE IRRA, 236, 236 (B.D. Dennis eds., 1989).
6.
See id. at 236-242.
7.
See id at 236-39.
8.
See id. at 237-38.
9.

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LImITS OF MARKETS 5

(Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2013). Sandel states,
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Morton J. Horwitz denounced the ideological and political character
of the L&E more than 30 years ago.10 Despite the denunciation revolving
around the neoliberal narrative and L&E, it been successfully enforced
within the public and global discourse. 1 In this paper, I return to
Horwitz's critique by quoting the marginalized economists of the
dominant discourse who have emphasized the limits of economic analysis.
I conclude by placing the economy's narrative and the L&E in its rightful
place regarding labor law.
As the cold war ended, markets and market thinking enjoyed unrivaled prestige,
understandably so. No other mechanism for organizing the production and
distribution of goods had proved as successful at generating affluence and
prosperity. And yet, even as growing numbers of countries around the world
embraced market mechanism in the operation of their economies something else
was happening. Market values were coming to play a greater and greater role in
social life. Economics was becoming an imperial domain. Today, the logic of
buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone but increasingly
governs the whole of life. It is time to ask whether we want to live this way.
Id. at 5-6.
10. Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905,
905-912 (1979-1980). The criticism of this author was based on the subjectivity of the notion of
efficiency used by the economists and the problem of the distribution of welfare. In that regard, they
state that,
Thus, both liberals and conservatives came initially to agree that the "correct"
solution for a court facing a transaction cost situation was to "mimic" the market-to
find the solution that the parties themselves would have agreed to if there had been
no transaction costs. But for liberals like Calabresi, there was only a formal
correspondence between finding the "cheapest cost avoider" and mimicking the
market. For conservatives, there appeared to be some imaginative act through
which the judge could actually empathize with bargaining individuals. But, in
practice, efficiency could be either the centralized technocratic manipulation of the
liberal policymaker or the results thought to be required in the fantasies of the free
market conservative. It was at this point that the ambiguities in applying this
analysis to law became increasingly apparent.
See id at 909.
From another similar perspective, Duncan Kennedy warns against the technocratic imperialism,
emphasizing that the judges easily manipulate the criterion of efficiency, both from a conservative
and liberal ideology. In his words,
An important implication of the analysis above is the tenuousness or even the
incoherence of the distinction between a free market solution and a regulatory
solution. There is no way to set the private law rules through the abstract definitions
of private property and freedom of contract. Setting the rules in their details by
applying Kaldor-Hicks is neither practically nor theoretically feasible. As a matter
of fact, courts and legislatures patently take a whole range of non-efficiency goals
into account in deciding issues like the scope of the law of nuisance and whether or
not to impose compulsory terms in consumer and labour contracts.
See Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economicsfrom the Perspective of CriticalLegal Studies, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 472 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan,
1998).
11. See Sandel, supra note 9, at 5-6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

3

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 4
320

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 35:2

I must make two clarifications. First, the fact that a particular
discipline is not an exact science does not affect its importance at all.
Moreover, precisely because it is an area of study centered on the
uncertainties of the human being, it is probably equal to or more difficult
than an area of study that can always contrast its theories with what
happens in the natural world.
Second, this work does not seek to attack the economy or economists
in general. The economy is a very relevant area of study and many
economists, past and present, must be taken seriously.
On the contrary, this work focuses on neoliberal hegemonic
economic thinking and its crusade against labor law through the L&E. My
criticism relates merely to the pseudoscientific character of its thought.
The following section, Section II, analyzes the criticisms made by
economists and social scientists to the claim of the hegemonic economic
narrative of being a scientific discipline like the natural sciences. Section
III critiques the L&E approach on Labor Law. And finally, Section IV
concludes by putting the economic narrative in its rightful place regarding
labor law.
II. ECONOMICS OR POLITICAL ECONOMY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Science is a discipline that seeks laws that might explain reality.
Constant relations between phenomena are found and formulated through
science, and it is precisely those laws that allow us to explain and predict
particular events. Science is a critical knowledge that stimulates and
develops doubts as much as possible, being aware of its provisional nature
and the possibility of being revised or overcome. 12
Science justifies its statements in two dimensions, a logical one and
an empirical one. Science seeks objectivity, that is, the subject must have
the capacity to be elevated above all historical and subjective
conditioning, and to have enough distance regarding the observed object,
so it is possible to adopt the point of view of a neutral observer.13 This
paradigm explains the ideals of natural sciences, and justifies some
reductionist views that estimate that social sciences are lacking due to the
fact that they will never reach the objectivity of the natural sciences.14
Other visions emphasize the irreducible specificity of humanities,
claiming for them their own particular method and a type of knowledge
12. Peter Kosso, Science and Objectivity, 86 THE J. OF PHIL. 245, 245 (1989).
13.
Id. at 245-46.
14.
It should be noted that the "objectivity of natural sciences" and the paradigm of modernity
about scientific knowledge is also under discussion in the present day. See id.
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of their own, more linked to understanding than explanation."
What about economics? This discipline is full of mathematical
calculus, graphics and statistics,' 6 and it seems to be the most exact of all
social sciences. 17 However, that is not true.
Many economists have emphasized how debatable economics can
be, its lack of precision, and how its "mathematization" is nothing more
than mere marketing.18 This is what David Colander calls "inappropriate
use of mathematics."' 9 There is no doubt that economics, as well as the
law, try to anticipate human behavior, which has been rich and
unpredictable from the very beginning.20
Proof of this is the investigation done by MIT Professor of Finance
Andrew Lo, who reviewed twenty-one books dedicated to explaining the
2008's financial crisis; eleven of them were written by academics, ten by
journalists and a former treasury secretary. 21 The conclusion is clear and
convincing: a unique interpretation regarding the crisis and its causes does
not exist among the experts, but rather a true Tower of Babel of different
15. Id
16. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND EcONOMICS, 1, 3, 7,44, 436 (Sally Yagan et al.
Eds., 6th ed. 2016) ("Economic theory has developed a precise calculus for making decisions under
uncertainty. . . .").

17. See Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion & Yann Algan, The Superiority ofEconomists, 29
J. OF ECON. PERSP. 89-91 (2015) ("[E]conomic graduates in elite programs agree that ... economics
is the most scientific ofthe social sciences."). Economics is the only social science with its own Nobel
Prize (courtesy of the Bank of Sweden). Economists usually have the greatest salaries within
universities, and are more likely to undertake expensive consultancies (up to 40% of their income) or
belong to business directories. See id. at 90.
18.

See, e.g., Megan Meardle, 4 PoliticallyControversialIssues Where All Economists Agree,

THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/4-politicallycontroversial-issues-where-all-economists-agree/2556000/; Krugman, supra note 4 (explaining how
economists are in trouble for expecting a frictionless market system); Economics is Not Math,
INSTITUTE
FOR
NEW
ECONOMIC
THINKING
(May
20,
2012),
https://www.ineteconomics.org/about/news/2012/economics-is-not -math; Cooter et al., supra note

16, at 4, 7, 44.
19.

David Colander, et al., Mathematics, Methods, and Modern Economics, 50 REAL-WORLD

ECON. REv. 118, 118 (2009) ("The key to appropriate use ofmathematics in economics is to find the
right mathematics to use for the right problem, and not to claim more for a mathematical model than
it delivers.").
20.

Ann Jennings, Social ConstructionsofMeasurement: Three Vignettes from Recent Events

and Labor Economics, 35 J. OF EcoN., 366 (Jun. 2001) ("All measures are social constructions,
requiring a more or less elaborate social and technological apparatus to defines what should be
counted, for tabulation, and identify and correct mistakes and errors .. . [and] [t]he apparatus is also
necessary."). The same arguments in relation to the "social constructions" of measurements can be

logically extended to the abuse of statistics. Both the sample chosen, and the type of average (mean,
median, or mode), the small data that are omitted, the correct way to present the graphs, the confusion
of correlation with causality, etc., allow to handle and lie with a semblance of objectivity.
21.

Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the FinancialCrisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, J. OF

ECON. LITERATURE 151, 154 (2012).
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and contradictory visions.2 2 Andrew Lo emphasizes the need for
economics to build more accurate narratives of the facts to be able to infer
more precise conclusions.23
Numerous contemporary economists and social scientists have
criticized the dominant neoliberal narrative, stressing that many of the
proposed labor deregulations, such as the lowering of the minimum wage,
have been negative.2 4
In the same way, and in other matters regarding the labor field, such
the
need to have stronger unions, several economists and social
as
scientists have denounced the harmful and political nature of many
neoliberal recommendations that have ended up weakening the unions,
increasing precarious work, and finally, undermining the middle class.2 5
Examples of this criticism appear in Algan and Cahuc,26 Atleson,2 7
Baylos,2 8 Brown and Oxenbridge,29 Western and Rosenfeld,30 Schenk,"
Stiglitz, 36 and
Forbath,32 Hacker and Pierson,3 3 Stern, 34 Raday,

22.
23.

See id. at 154-55.
Id. at 176-77.

24.

See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.

25.
26.

See infra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
See Phillipe Aghion, Yann Algan, & Pierre Cahuc, Civil Society and the State: The

Interplay Between Cooperation and Minimum Wage Regulation, 9 JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 3, 30-31 (2011); see also Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, LA SOCI-Tt DE
DtFIANCE: COMMENT LE MODtLE SOCIAL FRANCAIS S'AUTODtTRUIT? 77, 97-100 (tditions Rue

D'Ulm, 2007).
27.

See James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841,

871-72 (1985).
28.

See Antonio Baylos, ,PARA QUt SIRVE UN SINDICATO? (Madrid, Catarata, 2012).

29.

See William Brown & Sarah Oxenbridge, Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining:Law

and the Future of Collectivism, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW: LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE

QC 63, 69-77 (Catherine Bernard, Simon Deakin, Gillian S. Morris eds., Hart Publishing, 2004).
30.
Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Workers ofthe World Divide. The Decline ofLabor and
the Future of the Middle Class, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 88, 88-89 (2012).
31.
Christopher Schenk, UNIONS AND DEMOCRACY 1, 13 (Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 2014) ("[T]he plunge in unionization in the U.S. accounts for approximately a fifth of
the increase in hourly wage inequality among women and a third among men.").
32.

William E. Forbath, Worker's Rights and the Distributive Constitution, DISSENT

Q.

(Spring 2012) at 58-65.
Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 74 (Simon & Schuster
33.
Paperbacks, 2011).
34.
Andy Stern, Unions & Civic Engagement: How the Assault on Labor Endangers Civil
Society, DAEDALUS J. OF THE AMERICAN ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 119, 124-25 (Spring 2013).
35.
Frances Raday, The Decline of Union Power-StructuralInevitability or Policy Choice?,

in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 353-77 (J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischl y K. Klare eds.,
Oxford University Press, 2004).
36.

See Joseph E. Stiglitz, America Has a Monopoly Problem- and It's Huge, THE NATION

(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/america-has-a-monopoly-problem-and-its-huge/.
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Lichtenstein.37
Economics tries to be the most accurate social science, the most truly
scientific, although its predictive results are poor. Mario Bunge has
emphasized that the so-called economic science plays with ideas that have
little or nothing to do with the real world.38
Economists are indifferent to the truth, which is supposedly what
scientists seek.39 Members of the Austrian School, such as von Mises
argued that economic theories were true a priori.40 Another variant is that
of Milton Friedman, a champion, according to Bunge, of the fictitious or
antirealist variety in economics, where assumptions can be wildly
unrealistic, and only the consequences matter.4 1
David Colander accuses Milton Friedman of what he calls "The lost
art of the economists.' 1 2 In fact, the father of the famous economist J.M.
Keynes, John Neville Keynes, wrote in 1891 a famous book on economics
and its method The Scope andMethod ofPoliticalEconomy.4 3 In this text,
according to Colander, the elder Keynes distinguished among three
categories: positive economics (theoretical economic science, not
applied), normative economics (the study of what should be, not applied
economics) and the "art of economics" (refers to applied economics).4
These categories were recognized at the beginning of Milton Friedman's
work, Methodology of Positive Economy, but the categories are reduced
to just the first two in the rest of his text.45 Colander speaks of the "art of
37.

NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR, 141-

177 (Princeton University Press rev. ed., 2002).
38.

See MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

103 (1999).
39. See id. at 148.
40.
Setlev S. Schlicter, The a PrioriMethod ofEconomics - In Defense ofLudwig von Mises
12, 2014), https://www.fmancialsense.com/contributors/detlevEssay, FIN. SENSE (Apr.

schlicter/priori-method-economics-defense-ludqig-von-mises.
41.
Mario Bunge, Systems and Emergence, Rationality and Imprecision, Free-Wheeling and
Evidence, Science and Ideology Social Science and Its Philosophy According to van den Berg, 31

PHIL. OF THE SOC. SCI. 404, 409-10 (2001).
42.

2001).
43.
44.
45.

DAVID COLANDER, THE LOST ART OF ECONOMICS 19 (Edward Elgar ed. Northampton

See id
See id.
See id. at 19-21, 28.

To some extent, Friedman resumes the nineteenth-century hegemonic tendency that John Neville
Keynes preferred to ignore. The economy was cultivated in the nineteenth century in the faculties of

law or mainly in those of philosophy. And the discipline was called "economy" pure and simple,
unlike the "political economy" that was popular in the eighteenth century, because of liberal economic

theories that prevailed in the nineteenth century. By deleting the adjective "policy": economists could
claim that economic behavior was the reflection of a universal individual psychology, and not of
socially constructed institutions, an argument that could then be used to assert the nature of the
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economics," which studies a social science that seeks to understand a
complex social framework where exact sciences are often unsuccessful,
that is, when complex systems that are not reconcilable with a model or
equation must be understood, because the interactions are too many and
the dynamics are non-linear.46 However, economists often forget this and
suffer from "art-phobia." 4 7 The "art of economics" connects positive and
normative economics, linking what has been learned in positive
economics with the purposes developed by its normative counterpart to
analyze how realistic these ends are.48 It links real world solutions to real
world problems. 4 9 By neglecting the art of economics, we often work with
models that are unrealistic.50
Bunge enumerates certain characteristics of economics that keep it
from being a hard or exact science, such as investing a disproportionate
mathematical wit in formalizing, embellishing, and analyzing unverifiable
or false assumptions." Or as akin to theology, since it argues arduously
over concepts such as "scarcity, utility, shadow pricing and expectations,"
but it invests very little effort in linking these theoretical variables with
observable variables through economic indicators.5 2 In addition, the
dominant economists often make extravagant assertions in favor of
"behavioral and economic hypotheses" (with the name of laws or apriori
principles), and very seldom or never are they tested, or worse, when they
are proved as false, the economists continue to attribute to these claims a
Bunge categorically concludes
great heuristic or normative capacity.
that economics is a semi-science or proto-science, with some pockets of
mature science and others of pseudoscience,54 calling on economists to

principles of laissez-faire. See id. at 20-21. The report of the Gulbenkian Commission is conclusive
in this sense:
Political science as a separate discipline responded to an ulterior objective:
legitimizing the economy as a separate discipline. Political economy had been
rejected as an argument on the grounds that the state and the market operated and

had to operate according to different logics. And this logically required, as a longterm guarantee, the establishment of a separate scientific study of political space.
IMMANUEL WALLERSTIEN, OPEN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT OF THE GULBENKIAN COMMISSION
ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Stanford University Press 1996).
46.
Colander, supra note 42, at 22-23.
47.
Colander, supra note 42, at 10-11, 23.
48.
Colander, supra note 42, at 29.
49.
Colander, supra note 42, at 29.
50.
Colander, supra note 42, at 32.
51.
Bunge, supra note 38, at 150.

52.
53.
54.

Id at 150.
Id
Id at 152.
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refrain from using the economy as an excuse to do math.
In this way, hegemonic economics pretends to be a natural or exact
science when it is nothing more than an intellectual impostor that uses
mathematics and natural science models to disguise an ideology and,
contrary to its manifested purpose, to hold dogmas that cannot be
criticized or falsified. It is paradoxical, then, that many economists, on
the one hand, defend the nature of exact science of their discipline, but
betray one of the fundamental assumptions of the exact sciences: to be a
critical knowledge being constantly revised or surpassed.
In addition, economics partakes in the problems of all social sciences
All
(law obviously included) to make accurate measurements.
measurement requires assumptions that are their starting point, but in
social sciences there is usually no agreement on these assumptions.
Furthermore, any measurement should be based on assumptions about its
instruments, but in the social sciences it is much more difficult to be
certain about its measuring instruments according to an objective
pattern.59 Finally, any measurement involves the reduction of reality into
determinable or quantifiable dimensions. That is, reality is what can be
calculated, measured and manipulated, according to principles of logical
and mathematical equivalence. 6 0 But considering the temporal and
linguistic nature of social reality, these assumptions appear to be very
partial.
This last problem is aggravated by the insularity of economists. In
fact, in the United States, economics is the social discipline that cites or
quotes fewer studies or research papers of other colleagues in peer social
sciences (sociology, political science, psychology, etc.). 62
As the Gulbenkian Commission's report concludes, in taking the
natural sciences as a model, economics has created three kinds of
expectations born from political science and sociology that have proved
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 153.
See id
See id at 147.
See id at 16.
Id

60.
Id. at 16-17 ("Therefore, the claim that we have an immediate or intuitive knowledge of
other people (Schaitz 1967) and the demand that the models in social science should be generally
understandable (Schatz 1953) are guaranteed to produce truisms and falsities in industrial quantities.
By the same token such dogmatic pronouncements rule out the technical concepts and hypotheses

representing deep features of social reality, and block the construction of mathematical models.")
61. Id at 16.
62.

2011),

Citation Averages, 2000-2010, by Fields and Years, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (Mar. 31,

https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/citation-averages-2000-2010-by-fields-and-

years/415643.article#survey-answer.
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impossible to fulfill as they were initially announced: an expectation of
prediction, and an expectation of management, both based on an
expectation of quantifiable accuracy.6 3
III. LABOR LAW UNDER ECONOMIC ATTACK

Considering the deficiencies and shortcomings of the dominant
hegemonic discourse, and pondering the claim of economists to be an
exact science as an intellectual imposture, we can briefly review the
criticisms that L&E makes of labor law.
Richard Epstein, for example, is a great advocate of employment at
will.6 4 His reasoning is as follows: the contractual freedom of the parties
must be respected because it allows the realization of individual autonomy
and increases labor market efficiency.65 Discharge at will, he adds, reflects
the dominant practice in the market 66 and introducing a rule regarding
State regulation of
dismissal with just cause might alter that balance.
personal life, religious life, or political activities is undesirable, as it is in
labor relations.6 8
For Epstein, it is precisely the efficiency of discharge at will that
makes it so common and popular in the United States.69 In other words,
he states that the survival of the employment at will and the frequency of
its use can be considered a sign of its suitability.70 With such a free
system, it is not possible or probable that the employer will abuse the
worker, since the worker can always quit for good reason, without reason
or even for a bad reason.7 1 Employment at will is very cheap to administer
and, according to Epstein, it is easier for workers than for employers to
overcome the errors of a dismissal, because the worker can quickly get a
new job and free dismissal simplifies this task since it does not imply a
non-fulfillment or fault that stigmatizes the worker, since all employment
contracts are at will. 7 2
63.
See source cited supra note 45 and accompanying text.
And even in natural sciences it is recognized that the person who measures tends to modify whatever
is measured in their study, although this affirmation is still discussed in social sciences where it is
more obvious. Id.
64.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
65.
Id at 951.
66.
Id
67.
Id. at 952.
68.
Id at 954.
69.
Id at 965.
70.
Id at 948.
71.
Id at 965.
72.
Id at 970.
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As we can see, these arguments are of a theological kind. If you have
faith in what Epstein says, you will agree with his opinions. If you believe
that the worker is free, that he can always give up and find a better job,
that is, that the employer lives almost intimidated because the worker can
resign at any minute, you will find this argument very reasonable. If you
have faith that a social practice is only good because it lasts in time (like
what happened with slavery until the middle of the nineteenth century),
you will find Epstein's argument valid. Epstein does not provide any
evidence of why individual autonomy increases market efficiency. But
for L&E fans, to talk about "efficiency" is like mentioning a sacred word.
In the United States, an exceptional case is the state of Montana,
which has norms regarding contract termination that require a showing of
just cause for termination.74 Andrew P. Morriss, former Professor of Law
at Texas A & M, noted in 2007 that empirical studies regarding this law
concluded that its application had reduced employment in Montana by
0.46% per year.7 ' The accuracy of the calculation is striking and it is more
amazing that other studies conclude otherwise. As Ann McGinley points
out, almost ten years from the effective date of the dismissal law in
Montana, unemployment had fallen from 7.4% in 1987 to 5.5% in 1995.
After twenty years of enforcing Montana's dismissal law, employment
increased.7 7 It is obvious that we are not implying that the law generates
this effect. But the whole economic and neoliberal theory is debunked
with these statistics. More protections do not necessarily mean more
unemployment.
A very enthusiastic author of the L&E is the Professor of Labor Law
at Cornell University, Stewart J. Schwab. In a paper published last year,
Schwab explains the impact of L&E on labor law. 78 He groups the
relations between L&E and labor law in three "eras." 7 9 First, the era based
on the assumption that the market operated in perfect form.80 Then, a
73.

Id. at 951.

74.

In 1987 Montana published the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act,

establishing that dismissal should only be by just cause. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Story of the
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A Drama in 5 Acts, in EMP. L. STORIES 250,

250-51, 253-54 (S. Estreicher & G. Lester eds., 2007).
75.
Id. at 250.
76. Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
NationalDischargePolicy, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1443, 1522-23 (1996).
77. Bradley T. Ewing, Charles M. North & Beck A. Taylor, The Employment Effects of a
"Good Cause" DischargeStandard in Montana, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 17, 31 (2005).
78.
Stewart J. Schwab, Law-and-EconomicsApproaches to Labourand Employment Law, 33

INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 115, 115 (2017).
79.
See id.
80.
See id. at 118.
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second era that takes into account market failures. Finally, a current era
that debates between empirical studies to mediate and decide whether the
market works or not.
After explaining the history of L&E briefly, Schwab tries to illustrate
how L&E and labor law are related.82 He explains, for example, that the
optimal vacation time is two weeks,8 3 and that workers as rational agents
prefer contracts with less vacation but better pay. 84 Later he gives us some
"methodological data": L&E applied to labor law is based on the idea that
all agents are rational.8 ' He points out that for the economy, the
maximization of social efficiency is very relevant. 86 He also indicates that
economics instead of focusing on a normative analysis, is rather devoted
to a positive analysis." He adds that economics studies the unintended
consequences of regulations 88 and that defenders of the fact that labor law
should be protective of workers suffer from a lack of realism because
89
Schwab wonders who makes the laws, the weak or the powerful? And
of course, the answer is obvious since money greatly influences
lawmakers.9 0 Schwab then explains that L&E's followers measure social
welfare in a different way, considering not only workers but also
9
He
consumers, children, retirees, investors and non-workers. '
emphasizes that the protection of workers is not the sole purpose of
society. 9 2 Schwab adds that L&E takes into account that everything has a
price and that there must be awareness about this fact." He focuses on
the skepticism about regulation 94 and devotes an entire section to market
failures. 9 5 Finally, Schwab points out that in L&E the negotiating power

81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id at 121-29.
See id at 123-25. This is because the productivity of the worker rises with each week of

vacation. Id.

However, if vacation time moves up to three weeks, the increase of productivity

becomes uneconomical for the employer. Id. Consequently, vacations for L&E are only appropriate
when the employer makes a profit, that is, an increase in worker productivity greater than the cost of

paying the holiday. Id.
Id. at 125.
84.
Id at 129.
85.
Id. at 130.
86.
Id. at 131.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id at 131-32.
90.
Id. at 132.
91.
92.
Id.
Id. at 133.
93.
Id at 134-35.
94.
95

Id at 135.
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gap plays a limited role when studying the employment contract.96
In short, Schwab has ideological assumptions that distract him from
the scientific method necessary for an exact science that economists boast
of possessing. Trying to explain reality and the world of work relations
from the suspected rationality of its parties, in isolation from the
complexities of the human being, is closer to the vision that the prisoners
of Plato's Allegory of the Cave could have, instead of the vision of
scientists in search of the truth. The unidirectionality or bias of the
analysis generates incomplete answers and diagnoses. In the world of
human relationships, isolating a factor and raising it to be a supreme
guideline implies a loss of perspective. The economic perspective based
on the rationality of profits forgets the perspective of power. Using
Schwab's example, there may be employers who even prefer to earn less
or pay fines just to emphasize their power by not giving holidays even
though the workers are less productive and thus emphasizing who is in
charge. 97
Schwab also resorts to a sophism already supported by Hayek.98 It
reminds us that in society there are not only workers, but also children,
non-workers, consumers, retirees, etc. That is, the pie is not large enough
for everyone and we must choose, either the orphans or the unions. What
about the employers? They are never considered in these comparisons,
and therefore the argument, although false, is ingeniously operative:
pitting the weak and helpless against one other in a dramatic choice.
However, at this point we are already facing pure ideology. The scientist
has long since lost his way with these sophisms. Hayek developed this
99
argument early on, better known as insider/outsider.
In other words, trade unions hurt the rest of society because they
privilege their members with stable jobs, setting up barriers for
unemployed and informal workers to find a job.'0 0
If this were true, why do most developed countries maintain

96. Id. at 139.
97. See id. at 123-24, 139-41 (discussing the implications behind an employer's unequal
bargaining power).
98. See id at 133.
99. See id at 133-34. In 1944, in the first edition of The Road ofSerfdom, Hayek raised this
argument. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD OF SERFDOM. TEXT AND DOCUMENTS. The

definitive edition (Bruce Caldwell ed.,The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 153-154. This
argument became famous in Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower's work, Involuntary
Unemployment as an Insider-OutsiderDilemma. (Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, Involuntary
Unemployment as an Insider-OutsiderDilemma, (Inst. for Int'l Econ. Studies, Univ. of Stockholm,

Working Paper No. 282, 1984).
100.
See Schwab, supra note 78 at 119.
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collective bargaining systems that cover more than fifty percent of their
workers? L&E propagandists have no answer to this reality, rather than
continue to repeat their dogmas to the end.
In any case, Schwab's outburst of sincerity is appreciated, because
by saying the law is made by the powerful, we must understand that in
L&E there is no place for the weak. It is the legal version of social
Darwinism.101
Another enthusiastic L&E author is Professor Richard Posner, who
points out that he does not take sides about whether the price of labor
should be decided by a competitive market or a cartel system such as the
unions. 10 2 His analysis is positive and not normative,1 0 3 which means that,
in accordance with the hegemonic narrative, we shall not read a social
scientist but rather someone devoted to economics as an exact science.
It then manifests itself in favor of some regulations that were
considered protective in the United States in the 1930s (especially the
Wagner Act on Collective Bargaining), since clearly common law was not
efficient.1 04 However, Posner criticizes supporters of syndicalism who
argue that unions favor increased productivity because they ignore one of
the basic assumptions of the economy: that people in general and
employers in particular are rational maximizers of their profits.'0o If this
were so, that is, if unions improved productivity, employers would not
spend money and resources in discouraging the formation of unions, since
it would be an irrational behavior.' 06
But that is not the case, Posner states.1 0 7 Because common sense
indicates that unions raise the value of work beyond productivity and
therefore employers do not want them. 08 This explains why unions are
in favor of the minimum wage, to raise the price of non-unionized workers
that could replace union members, and also explains why trade unions
Social Darwinism is a variant of the inevitable progress doctrine. See Wallerstein, supra
101.
note 45. If progress is the result of the social struggle in which competition triumphs, to interfere in
that social struggle is to interfere with social progress. Id. Social Darwinism describes as irrational
and unreal any conception associated with the losers in the evolutionary process of the "survival of

the fittest." Id Technocratic rationality, as the most advanced version of modem rationalism, has in
many ways been the incarnation of social Darwinism. Id. Legitimacy is denied to any concept that
does not fit into a rationality model ofends and means, as well as any institution that has no immediate

functional
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

utility. Id.
Richard Posner, Some Economics ofLabor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 990 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 1000.
Id at 1001.
Id
Id.
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demand safety in their workplaces from the government, to reduce the
competition of non-unionized workers.109 A non-unionized worker might
accept a lower wage or less secure conditions than union workers and thus
compete just to get a job. But unions are able to neutralize this
competition with the minimum wage and the safety and hygiene standards
at work.
Posner continues, reasoning that unions are simply monopoly cartels
that restrict competition. " 0 For example, he explains that they generally
agree with the employer to derogate the rule of employment at will for
their members."' That is, dismissal must be with just cause. Posner again
suggests that this is a limitation to competition, as it provides preferential
treatment for older workers, who could be replaced by a younger worker,
but since dismissal must be with just cause the employer cannot get rid of
senior workers. 1'12
Posner complements these arguments on labor law in his famous
book regarding the economic analysis of law.1 3 He states that the tutelage
of the legislator is not necessary because if an employer is arbitrary or
capricious, then nobody will want to contract with him, which means that
the market will punish him and he will have to amend his behavior or pay
more." 4 The market is the antidote because the parties voluntarily
negotiate their contracts. 1
Richard Posner's arguments can be criticized from several points of
view. First of all, even though he believes that he is objective and that his
analysis is positive instead of normative, his starting point is that
competition is the best option and that the labor market works perfectly
on its own. That is, Posner begins his analysis by uncritically assuming
the neoliberal economic assumptions as dogma.
Secondly, some of his suggestions limit with ingenuity. To suggest
that the market will punish an arbitrary employer because nobody will
want to contract with him is derisory. Perhaps someone who has never
talked to a worker, or perhaps someone who has none of these
uncertainties can think something so alien to reality. Common sense and
minimal experience do not support this.
Thirdly, if what Posner claims is true, and the protection of labor and

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 1001-03.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1006-07.

113.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d. ed. 1977).

114.
115.

Id
Id
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unions limit competition resulting in harmful consequences for the
economy, growth, employment and prosperity, countries that do not
follow Posner's prescription should be bankrupt have thousands of
unemployed people, have greater poverty rates than the United States, and
be on the verge of collapse. But any average reader who cares about
general culture knows this is not true. It could be said Norway, Finland,
Canada, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland are the most advanced countries
on the planet, with greater degrees of freedom and equality, with a lower
poverty rate, in short, enviable societies with protective labor legislation,
unions a lot more powerful than those in the United States, sectorial
negotiations or branches. 1 16 What could Posner, the objective, the positive
analyst, the scientific economist tell us about the success of these
countries?
In summary, although one may argue that the law should refrain from
protecting the worker and the unions, it is not legitimate to present this
opinion as a truth born from an exact science, with a technical and
allegedly non-ideological format, because economic knowledge that
supports this responds to a social science instead of the knowledge of an
exact science as if it were physics, chemistry or biology. And even less
so when these laws regarding labor law's supposed inefficiency do not
apply to countries that maintain a strengthened protection of worker and
their unions.
However, we must recognize the success of the neoliberal economic
narrative that has monopolized public discourse and has penetrated the
debate of labor law academics.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FALSE SCIENTIFIC PRESTIGE OF ECONOMICS

The economic analysis of law, I believe, could maintain its
prestige only so long as it wrapped itself in the cloak of science.
Once its practitioners become overt apologists for a grossly
unequal Distribution of Wealth, it is only a matter of time before
they are pluralistically assigned to the class of one of the many
"ideologies" from which one may pick and choose. After twenty
years of attempting to claim that they stood above ideology in
116.
Uri Friedman, What's So Special About Finland?, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/nordic-american-dreampartanen/489032/; Emily Tamkin, Will Everyone Shut Up Already About How the Nordic Countries
Top
Every
Global
Ranking?,
SLATE
(Aug.
29,
2014,
9:00
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-world_/2014/08/29/will everyone shutupalreadyabouthow-th
e nordiccountriestop everyglobal.html.
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their devotion to science, the practitioners of law-andeconomics have finally been forced to come out of the closet
and debate ideology with the rest of us.

17

Neo-liberal economists have shaped our lives as if they were some
sort of gurus, spreading a series of ideas as if they were objective and
unquestionable truths. They have provided theoretical justifications for
the financial deregulation and the unbridled pursuit of short-term
profits.' 18 They have encouraged and justified policies that have produced
slower growth, greater inequality, less secure jobs, and more frequent
financial crises than three decades ago.11 9 Economists have helped to
destabilize the lives of citizens, and have presented as inevitable the
increases in inequality, the astronomical salaries of executives, and the
extreme poverty in poor countries.1 20 As Sandel states, " [t]he more
markets extend their reach into noneconomic spheres of life, the more
entangled they become with moral questions." 2 1
This means that a subjective and fallible ideology, disguised as an
absolute mathematical truth, predominates in political discourse as the
revealed truth and dominates the most important decisions for our planet
in the so-called information age.
Consequently, should we dispense with economics? Obviously not.
What we denounce as imposture is the type of neoliberal economic
narrative of the last three decades, which leads the world off an economic,
social, environmental and political cliff.
But there are other economists who take the importance of the
economy very seriously and we are not only talking about the founding
fathers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 12 2 All their works
117.

Horwitz, supra note 10, at 912.

118.

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 102, at 1000-01.

119.
JeffMadrick, Seven BadIdeas: How MainstramEconomists Have DamagedAmericaand
the
World,
WHAT'S
THE
MATTER
WITH
ECONOMICS?
(Dec.
18,
2014),

http://jpalafox.blogs.uv.es/files/2014/11/What/E2%80%99s-the-Matter-with-Economics.pdf.
See HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON'T TELL You ABOUT CAPITALISM, 28-30
120.
(Bloomsbury Press 2010); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To

Do?, 18 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009 (pointing out that in 2007 the remuneration of general
managers of the largest companies in the United States was 344 times that of an average worker. In

1980 it was 42 times. Compared to other countries, according to data from 2004-2006, U.S. general
managers earned, on average, 13.3 million dollars per year- with their peers in Europe earning 6.6
million and 1.5 million in Japan. Is it that U.S. general managers have twice as much merit as their
European peers and nine times that of the Japanese? Or is it that the market or personal merit has
nothing to do with this issue?).
121.
122.

SANDEL, supranote 9, at 88.
Robert W. Clower, The State of Economics: Hopeless But Not Serious, THE SPREAD OF

ECONOMIC IDEAS 23,24 (David C. Colander & AW. Coats eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989).
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recognize that capitalism is developed through investments and
technological innovations in the long term. 123
Bruce E. Kaufman has studied the evolution of economic thought
regarding labor markets, noting that most economists have recognized that
it is an imperfect market and that it therefore requires legal interventions
and promotion of collective bargaining. 124 In his analysis he mentions
Adam Smith, 125 Alfred Marshall, 12 6 and the institutionalist economists of
the University of Wisconsin who have been influenced by the ideas of the
British economist couple Sydney and Beatrice Webb (Commons,
Perlman, Witte, and Lescohier), 1 27 Douglass, Millis, and Slicher, 12 8 the
post-World War II economists called neo-institutionalists or neo-classical
revisionists (Dunlop, Kerr, Lester, and Reynolds),12 9 and more
contemporaneously, the Cambridge Group (MIT and Harvard professors
such as Samuelson, Solow, Thurow, Freeman, Doeringer, Piore,
Summers, Akerlof, and Osterman). 130 All of these economists agree that
the labor market is imperfect.131 They obviously differ in their views
about the degree of regulation or the degree of collective bargaining
required to solve these imperfections, but they agree that the work market
is far from operating perfectly.
The great exception is the Chicago School (Friedman, Stigler, Lewis
and Becker). 132 These economists believe that the labor market works
perfectly and therefore there is no need for regulations or collective
bargaining.133 The Chicago School has been the basis of neoliberal
hegemony in the world, and we must not confuse it with the economists
or the economy as an important and respectful social science. Kaufman
attempts to explain why this trend in Chicago has been so popular and
successful, mentioning, for example, that one of the factors that has

123.

Chang mentions List, Schumpeter, Kaldor, Hirschman, Simon, Pigou, Sen, Baumol, and

Stiglitz. CHANG, supra note 120, at 250.
See Bruce E. Kaufman, The Evolution of Thought on the Competitive Nature of Labor
124.
Markets, LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 145, 145-47 (Clark Kerr & Paul D.

Staudohar eds., 1994).
Id. at 147-50. In any case, he states that Smith seems to contradict himself in some
125.
passages of his classic work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations. Id. at
150.
126.
Id. at 150-53.
127.
Id at 153-57.
Id at 157-62.
128.
129.
Id. at 162-68.
Id. at 177-82.
130.
131.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 168-77.
132.
Id. at 168-69, 171.
133.
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allowed this success has been the economists' divorce between theory and
reality. 134 However, the process of spreading ideas involves complex
interactions ranging from universities to government research policies,
including foundations, publishers, the press, political parties, and
lobbying organizations.135

And a key aspect in the diffusion of ideas is money, as Colander
points out, "[m]oney acts as a magnet, directing research and ideas."1 3 6
And there is no doubt that businessmen have financed numerous think
tanks and foundations since the 1980s. 13 7 Unfortunately lost in the pursuit
of funding is neutrality.138

We cannot help but admit how successful the dissemination of
neoliberal ideas has been and how it has reached the law through L&E.
As I have explained in this paper, economics is a necessary and important
social science; but as a social science it cannot claim the objectivity,
accuracy, predictability, and rigor of the physical sciences. The neoliberal
narrative that has been hegemonic so far must give way to real social
scientists. From the perspective of the social sciences, L&E cannot even
be considered as a methodological contribution superior to law, sociology,
or political science.
How about the law? The law is a civilizing development that should
not be influenced by theories that are protected by their hypothetical
accuracy when they are nothing more than disguised ideologies. And
labor law? Labor law has allowed the success of the capitalist system. Its
regulations played a key role in the inclusion of workers into the system
and also relaxed its ferocity.
The unions allowed a significant
participation of the workers, enabled the redistribution of income and
were the voice of the voiceless. However, labor law has been a victim of
its own success. 139 Societies that developed after the fall of the Soviet
134.

Id. at 184.

135. A.W. Coats & David C. Colander, An Introduction to the Spread ofEconomic Ideas, THE
SPREAD OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 1, 9 (David C. Colander & A.W. Coats eds., Cambridge Univ. Press,

1989).
136.

David C. Colander, Money and the Spread ofldeas, THE SPREAD OF ECONOMIC IDEAS

229, 229 (David C. Colander & A.W. Coats eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989).
137. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism 22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2005) (pointing
out, neoliberal ideas were explicitly diffused within the academy by the University of Chicago, and
through several generously funded think tanks such as the Institute of Economics Affaires or the
Heritage Foundations.).

138.

Id. at 233.

139.

As Bauman points out, the phantom of the revolution was key for the capitalist state of the

early twentieth century to establish boundaries on corporate profits and limit the appetite ofthose who
went after the gains and the inhumanity of working conditions, thereby impeding the proletarian
pauperization, and noting that the workers established themselves, either with pleasure or lack of
interest, within the capitalist society. See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: SOCIAL
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Union turned to neoliberalism with the illusion that a counterweight to
business power was not necessary and that globalization and the so-called
free market would benefit us all.140 And we have ended up in a world
nationally and globally dominated by private monopolies. The time will
come for us to return to our good senses, to find the golden mean,
prudence represented in a democracy free from the influence of the rich,
and a labor law that fulfills its mission of defending the weak.
Labor law is not the villain of the movie. But at this point neoliberal
hegemony is at the forefront of the narrative, a narrative that argues that
workers are to blame for recession, the lack of growth and the high rates
of unemployment. In this narrative, it is not economics that has failed but
labor and labor law. Neoliberal economists have been tacitly suggesting
this for decades based on misperceptions regarding their knowledge of
both their own and other disciplines.
Labor lawyers must stop feeling guilty for economic failure and must
stop being intimidated by the supposedly greater rigor of economics. We
must recover our original vocation and voice in support of a more human
labor law and practice, which will also increase the true wealth of society.

IN
A
GLOBAL
AGE
18,
48-49
(Polity
Press
2011),
https://books.google.com/books/about/CollateralDamage.html?id
dbHgl ZaYkoC&printsec=frontcover&source=kpread_button#v-onepage&q=revolution&f-false.
And this is why Lenin affirms that the proletariat freed to its own resources and wisdom would not
succeed in overcoming the trade-union mentality. Id at 18. This unexpected course taken by the
workers entering the bosom of capitalism thanks to the protective union legislation openly
contradicted the expectations of the Marxian analysis. Id. This is why some authors have emphasized
how important labor law has been for the development of a moderate capitalist system instead of the
savage capitalism of the nineteenth century. See Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Towards a
New Historiographyof Collective BargainingLaw, 4 INDUS. REL. L. J. 450, 452 (1981) [hereinafter
Klare, Labor Law]; Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV.
255, 270-72 (1990); Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law,
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 3,12 (Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl
Klare eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2004) [hereinafter Klare, The Horizons]. From this perspective, labor
law helped consolidate the corporate power while limiting the most serious abuses in the system. See
Klare, Labor Law, Id.; Gordon,Id., and Klare, The Horizons, Id.
140. See BAUMAN, supranote 139, at 48-49.
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